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# **EFFECTS OF ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION ON NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY**

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# OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

- △ **Historical case study approach (to maximize reliance on empirical information):**
  - Literature reviews
  - Interviews
  
- △ **3 case studies (chosen for their relevance to the U.S. nuclear power industry):**
  - Deregulation of the U.S. aviation industry
  - Deregulation of the U.S. rail industry
  - Restructuring of the U.K. electricity industry
  
- △ **Purpose:**
  - Develop a complete list of changes relevant to safety
  - Emphasize changes with possible negative effects on safety

# TIME SCALE

- △ **Adjusting to deregulation is a lengthy process:**
  - **The air and rail industries were deregulated more than 20 years ago**
  - **All three case study industries are still undergoing significant changes in response to deregulation**
  
- △ **There is a long learning curve associated with deregulation**

# OVERALL SAFETY PERFORMANCE

- △ **A general decline in safety need not follow economic deregulation:**
  - **Both the air and rail industries in the U.S. had generally better safety records after deregulation**
  - **Nuclear plant managers in the U.K. focused more intently on regulatory compliance and hardware reliability after deregulation**
  
- △ **However, the magnitude and speed of the changes associated with deregulation pose substantial challenges to the management of safety:**
  - **Safety problems due to deregulation were observed in all three case study industries**

# SAFETY CULTURE

- △ **Deregulation creates major challenges to safety culture**
  
- △ **In aviation and rail, corporate culture adversely affected safety after mergers and acquisitions:**
  - **3 fatal accidents and 7 fatalities in 7 months after the Union Pacific/Southern Pacific merger**
  - **“Union Pacific’s by-the book culture clashed badly with Southern Pacific’s, ...making do with chewing gum and bailing wire” (Passell, 1998, *New York Times*)**
  
- △ **New entrant airlines were substantially more risky than established airlines**
  
- △ **Underreporting of safety problems is reported to have increased in the railroad industry after deregulation**

# SAFETY CULTURE (continued)

- △ In the U.K. nuclear power industry, corporate culture concerns dealt with use of contractors and loss of institutional memory:
  - “Few contractors understood the implications of the site licence”
  - “Neither were they aware of the licensee’s safety standards and cultures” (Allars, 1999, U.K. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate)
  
- △ Safety regulators in the U.S. rail and U.K. nuclear power industries have proposed requiring prior review of major organizational changes that can affect safety

# RE-PRIORITIZATION OF EXPENDITURES

- △ **Companies in all three case studies undertook major re-prioritizations of their expenditures:**
  - **Airlines increased the amount of time between engine overhauls after deregulation, but did not experience a higher rate of engine failures**
  - **In the rail industry, annual capital expenditures on track maintenance increased by a factor of five, while employment was cut in half**
  - **The U.K. nuclear power industry also experienced dramatic downsizing after deregulation, coupled with increased use of contractors**
  
- △ **Such changes are not necessarily adverse to safety:**
  - **But can cause safety problems if organizations make excessive cuts in safety-related areas**

# FINANCIAL PRESSURES

- △ **Financial difficulties appear to be associated with safety problems in the rail and aviation industries**
  
- △ **The link between poor profitability and safety problems appears strongest for small and unprofitable companies (Rose, 1989, 1990):**
  - **“Lower profitability is correlated with higher accident and incident rates—particularly for smaller carriers”**
  - **“Smaller firms...may be more responsive to fluctuations in the economic environment”**
  - **“More intense scrutiny of the safety practices of financially marginal carriers is desirable”**
  
- △ **Companies in financial distress may have increased incentives to cut corners:**
  - **Therefore, financial difficulty may be a leading indicator of declining safety margins**

# **DOWNSIZING**

- △ Significant concerns were raised regarding downsizing and fatigue in the rail and U.K. nuclear power industries:**
  - Federal investigations of major railroad accidents have identified inadequate staffing and fatigue as contributing factors (including after mergers)**
  - In the U.K., regulators raised concerns that downsizing has led to loss of institutional memory and excessive reliance on contractors**
  
- △ Safety regulators in both industries also raised concerns about increased use of overtime**

# EXPERIENCES OF SAFETY REGULATORS

## △ Workload increases:

- The FAA experienced staff and budget cuts around the time of deregulation, and later found that its staffing levels were insufficient to meet the increased workload
- U.K. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) increased staffing levels in anticipation of privatization

## △ Importance of organizational factors and safety culture:

- Safety regulators in both the rail and U.K. nuclear power industries found it advisable to begin requiring prior regulatory approval of significant organizational changes:
  - Major mergers and acquisitions (rail)
  - Downsizing and outsourcing (U.K.)

## △ “NII expects licensees to demonstrate that proposed changes are fully considered before... implementation” (Reiersen, 1999, U.K. NII)

# CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO SAFETY

- △ **In all three case studies, circumstances favorable to safety may have counteracted safety problems due to deregulation:**
  - **The decades-long trend of improving safety in aviation may have masked adverse safety consequences of deregulation**
  - **The improved financial performance of the rail industry as a result of deregulation was conducive to safety**
  - **Rail deregulation took place at a time when the Federal Railroad Administration was becoming more active in safety regulation**
  - **The years immediately following nuclear power privatization in the U.K. were accompanied by extensive financial subsidies**
  - **The NII was actively involved in planning for and monitoring the transition to privatization in the U.K.**

# **CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO SAFETY (continued)**

- △ These favorable conditions may not be present in the U.S. nuclear industry:
  - Therefore, safety improvements similar to those in the aviation and rail industries may not be observed****
  
- △ In the absence of such favorable conditions, deregulation could have greater adverse impacts on safety in the U.S. nuclear power industry than in the case study industries**

# **SUMMARY—CONDITIONS WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON SAFETY**

- △ Long learning curve**
  
- △ Major re-prioritization of expenditures:**
  - E.g., maintenance
  
- △ Challenges to safety culture:**
  - Mergers and acquisitions
  - New entrants
  - Other management changes
  - Pressures to under-report
  - Use of contractors
  - Loss of institutional memory
  
- △ Financial pressures**
  
- △ Downsizing:**
  - Inadequate staffing
  - Excessive overtime
  - Increased use of contractors
  - Loss of institutional memory
  
- △ Increased workloads for safety regulators**

# **SUMMARY—CONDITIONS WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON SAFETY (continued)**

## **△ Other possible effects:**

- Aging of equipment**
- Effects on human capital (e.g., skill/experience)**
- Reduced support services (e.g., engineering)**
- Reduced bench-marking**
- Poor labor relations**

# OVERALL LESSONS LEARNED

- △ **Deregulation is not incompatible with maintaining or even improving safety**
  
- △ **The magnitude and speed of the changes associated with deregulation create major challenges to the management of safety (Neuschel, 1988):**
  - **“Achieving safety under deregulation is a particularly demanding task that requires intensive management skill and dedication...**
  - ***“Safety can be managed even under deregulation.***
  - **“But it takes total commitment, special know-how, a highly disciplined work force and exemplary skill by management.”**
  
- △ **Careful review of safety problems encountered in other deregulated industries may make it possible to minimize similar problems in the U.S. nuclear power industry**